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Criminal Law
by Franklin J. Hogue*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year I selected a small number of significant cases and amendments to Georgia criminal law on which to focus this Survey. This
allows slightly more in-depth treatment within the space limitations and
may be more useful, so I hope, to practicing trial lawyers in the everchanging area of criminal law. This survey period covers developments
from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009.1
II.

THE SLEEPWALKING DEFENSE: INVOLUNTARY ACT OR INSANITY?

In Smith v. State,2 Tavaris Smith and his wife had a stormy marriage. Smith threatened to kill his wife and put a gun to her head on a
previous occasion. Not surprisingly, she was considering divorcing him.
On the night of June 5, 2003, however, Smith shot her while she slept,
killing her.3
Smith hoped to defend against the charge of murder by offering
evidence that he shot his wife while sleepwalking; therefore, he could not
have formed the intent to kill.4 He indicated his desire to present

* Partner in the law firm of Hogue & Hogue, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Faculty, National
Criminal Defense College; Adjunct Faculty, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law. Atlanta Christian College (BA, magna cum laude, 1980); Emmanuel School of
Religion (M.A., summa cum laude, 1983); Georgia State University (MA., summa cum
laude, 1988); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1991).
Member, State Bar of Georgia; Past-President, Macon Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers; Secretary, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
1. For analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see Franklin J.
Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 85 (2008).
2. 284 Ga. 33, 663 S.E.2d 155 (2008).
3. Id. at 33, 663 S.E.2d at 156.
4. Id. at 34, 663 S.E.2d at 156.
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expert testimony that he suffered from a physiological sleep disorder,
which caused him to shoot his wife either while asleep or "in a state of
confusional arousal due to the disorder."'
Smith did not file a notice of intent to present an insanity defense
pursuant to section 17-7-130.1 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.), 6 arguing that he did not consider his defense to involve
insanity.7 The trial court concluded, however, that Smith's sleepwalking defense amounted to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and,
pursuant to the insanity statute, appointed an expert to examine him.'
In addition, the court charged the jury on insanity, explaining that
Smith bore the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence even though Smith's own expert testified that Smith was not
insane at the time of the shooting.9 The jury convicted Smith of
murder 0
On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Smith argued that the trial
court erred by requiring him to proceed under an insanity defense.11
The court agreed and reversed his conviction.' 2 Quoting from Wayne
LaFave's Substantive CriminalLaw, 3 the court observed:
A defense related to but different from the defense of insanity is that
of unconsciousness, often referred to as automatism: one who engages
in what would otherwise be criminal conduct is not guilty of a crime if
he does so in a state of unconsciousness or semi-consciousness.
Although this is sometimes explained on the ground that such a person
could not have the requisite mental state for commission of the crime,
the better rationale
is that the individual has not engaged in a
14
voluntary act.
Additionally, the court noted that the Model Penal Code 5 and the
majority of courts that have considered the sleepwalking defense have
concluded that "people who commit potentially criminal acts because of
such disorders should not be criminally responsible because they are not

5.

Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130.1 (2008).
Smith, 284 Ga. at 34, 663 S.E.2d at 156.
Id.; see O.C.GA. § 17-7-130.1.
Smith, 284 Ga. at 34, 36, 663 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 33 n.1, 663 S.E.2d at 156 n.1.
Id. at 34, 663 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 34, 36, 663 S.E.2d at 156, 158.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2003).
Smith, 284 Ga. at 34, 663 S.E.2d at 156 (quoting 2 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 9.4).

15.

MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
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acting voluntarily and with criminal intent."" The court also referred
to its own dicta from a case sixty-five years earlier involving sleepwalking.17 In that case, the court concluded that an unconscious act without
intent would run afoul of the statutory requirement that every crime
involve the joint operation of criminal act and criminal intent.,
The additional rationale behind refusing to classify sleepwalking as an
insanity defense is that "criminally insane defendants are often
committed to a mental institution for mental rehabilitation," a treatment
that would not help a sleepwalker. 9 Unlike the criminally insane, who
suffer permanent or semi-permanent disabilities, the sleepwalker's
problem only occurs when he is sleeping.2 ° This problem, while
troubling, especially when there are guns around, is not a permanent
mental disorder for which rehabilitative treatment would have any
ameliorating effect. 2
Thus, though sure to be applied only on rare occasions, it is now the
law in Georgia that one who commits what would otherwise be a
criminal act and who raises the defense that he or she did it while
sleepwalking, or presumably in some other unconscious automaton-like
state, need not proceed under the requirements of the insanity statute.2 2
III.

HEY, THATS MY WALLET: LOST BUT NOT ABANDONED

In Wolf v. State,2 off-duty police officer Stan Moore, while providing
security at a concert, spied a wallet lying on the ground outside the
concert hall. He believed that the wallet had been lost but not

16.

Smith, 284 Ga. at 34-35,663 S.E.2d at 156-57 (citing McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d

104, 106-07 (Ind. 1997); State v. Massey, 747 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Kan. 1987); State v. Bush,
595 S.E.2d 715, 721-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hinkle, 489 S.E.2d 257, 262-63 (W.
Va. 1996); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01(2b)).

17. Id. at 35, 663 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 763, 27 S.E.2d 659,
665 (1943)).
18. Id. (citing Lewis, 196 Ga. at 763, 27 S.E.2d at 665); see also O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1(a)
(2007).
19. Smith, 284 Ga. at 35, 663 S.E.2d at 157 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mike
Horn, A Rude Awakening: What to Do With the Sleepwalking Defense?, 46 B.C. L. REV. 149,

166 (2004)).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. At the time of this writing, Smith is back in court, now raising the issue before a
special jury that he is not competent to stand trial. Amy Leigh Womack, Bibb Jury Unable
to Reach Mental Competency Decision, MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 15, 2009, available at
http-//www.macon.comllocal/story/810532.html.

23. 291 Ga. App. 876, 663 S.E.2d 292 (2008).
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abandoned by its owner. After picking it up, Moore looked inside the
wallet three times; first, to ascertain its owner. Moore found William
Wolf's driver's license, so he and other officers went to find him.'
While carrying the wallet during the search for its owner, Moore could
feel "'something granular ...crunching around'" inside.25 For a second
time Moore looked inside the wallet, this time to ascertain the source of
the crunching sensation, thinking that it was either drugs or that
something made of glass had broken inside the wallet. Moore found the
crunching was caused by a bag of methamphetamine in the compartment
of the wallet designed to hold money. Upon discovering the drugs,
Moore looked in the wallet a third time, then looking for an automobile
insurance
card so that he could find the owner's car in the parking
26
lot.

Moore found Wolf's car while another security officer found Wolf. Wolf
acknowledged that the wallet was his but accused someone of planting
the meth in it. However, a search of Wolf's person turned up the empty
shell of a plastic pen-an item useful for ingesting meth-and Wolf was
subsequently charged with possessing both the meth and the drugrelated object. He moved to suppress both items but lost in the trial
court.

27

The only search at issue on appeal was the second one, which was
conducted after the discovery of the crunching sensation.28 While the
trial court correctly considered Wolf to have lost his wallet, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held it was error to conclude that he had thereby
abandoned it. 29 Voluntarily abandoned property leaves its owner with

no expectation of privacy in it.30 The question of abandonment,
however, turns on the intent of the person whose property it is-whether
he or she has in some way relinquished interest in it.31 This includes
knowingly exposing it to the public, such as one does when leaving
garbage outside the curtilage of a home.32
Wolf, by contrast, did not relinquish any interest in his wallet, even
claiming it as his when confronted by the police, and he did not even

24. Id. at 876-77, 663 S.E.2d at 293-94.

25. Id. at 877, 663 S.E.2d at 294 (alteration in original).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 878, 663 S.E.2d at 294.

29. Id.
30. Id. (citing United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (abandoned
briefcase); Keilholtz v. State, 261 Ga. App. 1, 4, 581 S.E.2d 660, 663 (2003) (abandoned
car)).

31. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 294-95.
32. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 295 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988)).
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know until then that he had lost it. 33 What makes this case notewor-

thy for this Survey is that the court of appeals had never before
addressed whether a person retains an expectation of privacy in an item
that has been lost but not abandoned.' As a consequence the court
surveyed the law in other jurisdictions, noting other courts have held
that citizens retain their expectation of privacy in wallets and other
personal effects when the item has been lost.35 The court said, however, the expectation of privacy is diminished by losing the item because
police may examine it to find out who owns it to return the item.36
The "crunchy feel" search of Wolf's wallet violated Wolf's Fourth
Amendment3 7 expectation of privacy because the officer did not enter
the wallet to ascertain the identity of its owner, as he did on the first
and third searches. 3 Thus, the methamphetamine should have been
excluded by the trial court.39 Because Wolf's arrest was predicated on
an illegal search of his wallet, the discovery of the hollow pen was also
illegal and should have been suppressed as "'fruit of the poisonous
tree.'"40

IV. RES GESTAE: A HEARSAY EXCEPTION WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED,
ALMOST

State,41

Canton Police Officer Isin encountered Juan
In Cuyuch v.
Pasqual bleeding from a cut on his arm. Pasqual told Officer Isin that
Pasqual's roommate, Leonardo Cuyuch, cut him. Upon inquiry, Pasqual
told Officer Isin where he and his roommate lived and that Cuyuch was
still there at that time.
Officer Isin stayed with Pasqual while Sergeant Lummus went to the
apartment to look for Cuyuch. While on the way, Sergeant Lummus
encountered Francisco Lorenzo standing on the side of the road, yelling
that his friend needed help. Because of a language barrier, Sergeant
Lummus couldn't determine who Lorenzo was saying needed help.
Sergeant Lummus put Lorenzo in his car and asked Lorenzo to direct
him to the injured friend. Lorenzo directed Sergeant Lummus to the

33. Id.
34.
35.
36.
1988);
37.

Id. at 879, 663 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 879 & n.7, 663 S.E.2d at 295 & n.7 (collecting cases).
Id. at 879, 663 S.E.2d at 295 (citing State v. Pidcock, 759 P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Or.
State v. Kealey, 907 P.2d 319, 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Wolf, 291 Ga. App. at 879, 663 S.E.2d at 295-96.
See id. at 880, 663 S.E.2d at 296.
Id. (quoting State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga. App. 868, 871, 658 S.E.2d 424, 428 (2008)).
284 Ga. 290, 667 S.E.2d 85 (2008).
Id. at 290, 667 S.E.2d at 87.
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apartment where Cuyuch and Pasqual lived. When Sergeant Lummus
arrived, Cuyuch was lounging on a sofa, calmly watching TV. Another
person was also present, across from Cuyuch, watching TV."
Sergeant Lummus could not understand what Lorenzo was saying as
he pointed to Cuyuch, who did not appear injured, so Lummus got
somebody to translate. Lorenzo told the officers that Pasqual needed
help, that Cuyuch had cut him, and that the knife Cuyuch had used was
in the yard."
Sergeant Lummus found the knife and radioed Officer Isin to tell him
that he had arrested Cuyuch. Officer Isin then drove Pasqual to the
apartment to identify the person who had cut him. When Officer Isin
and Pasqual arrived, Cuyuch was handcuffed and sitting in the back of
Sergeant Lummus's patrol car. Pasqual told Officer Isin that Cuyuch
was the person who had cut him.4
At trial, the State could not locate Pasqual or his friend Lorenzo. The
translator did not testify, so the State used the two police officers to
make its case against Cuyuch by having them convey what Pasqual and
Lorenzo said to them. Cuyuch was convicted of aggravated battery.4 6
The court of appeals affirmed,47 but the supreme court granted
certiorari and reversed.48
Using Crawford v. Washington,4 9 the supreme court analyzed the
confrontation issue. 0
The issue turned on whether Pasqual and
Lorenzo's statements, which were clearly hearsay, were admissible as
non-testimonial in this instance when made to the police to assist them
in meeting an emergency.5 1 If the primary purpose of their out-of-court
statements was to "'establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution,'" then they would be testimonial in
nature.52 Thus, their admission against Cuyuch would violate his Sixth
Amendment" right to confrontation unless the declarants were

43. Id. at 290-91, 667 S.E.2d at 87.
44. Id. at 291, 667 S.E.2d at 87.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Cuyuch v. State, 286 Ga. App. 629, 634, 649 S.E.2d 856, 860 (2007). The decision
was 5-2. See id. at 629, 634, 649 S.E.2d at 857, 860. Judge Bernes dissented, and thenChief Judge Barnes joined the dissent. Id. at 634, 649 S.E.2d at 860 (Bernes, J.,
dissenting).
48. Cuyuch, 284 Ga. at 290, 667 S.E.2d at 86-87.
49. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
50. Cuyuch, 284 Ga. at 291-92, 667 S.E.2d at 87.
51. See id. at 294, 667 S.E.2d at 89.
52. Id. at 292, 667 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006)).
53.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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unavailable and Cuyuch had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
them.'
The court assumed that the primary purpose of Pasqual's statement
to Officer Isin that his roommate cut him and was still at home was nontestimonial and was made to enable Officer Isin to meet an ongoing
emergency.5 5 However, Pasqual's identification of Cuyuch as he sat in
the back of Sergeant Lummus's car was testimonial because its purpose
was to establish a past fact-the identity of the knife-wielding cutter-for use in a future prosecution.5" Thus, it should not have been
admitted against Cuyuch because he had no opportunity to crossexamine Pasqual. 7 Likewise, Sergeant Lummus's testimony conveying
the hearsay statement of Lorenzo should have been excluded because
Lorenzo was not attempting to help the officer deal with an emergency;
rather, Lorenzo was telling Sergeant Lummus who cut Pasqual.58 In
addition, Lorenzo's statement that the knife used by Cuyuch was in the
front yard was deemed testimonial, and thereby inadmissible, because
it was given to provide evidence against Cuyuch.5 9
This case is noteworthy because the analysis by the court of appeals
turned on the concept of res gestae.' The supreme court, by contrast,
nowhere uses this phrase.6 1 In analyzing the case this way, the
supreme court appears to have moved further away from res gestae, a
hearsay exception so broad in practice as to have nearly swallowed the
rule. The court seems to have moved to a more specific post-Crawford
analysis involving the difference between the testimonial and nontestimonial character of the out-of-court statements. While unsuccessful
to date, suggested revisions to the Georgia evidence code favor language
that would track Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) 2 and would eliminate

54. Cuyuch, 284 Ga. at 291-92, 667 S.E.2d at 87-88 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at
53-54).

55. Id. at 294, 667 S.E.2d at 89.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 295, 667 S.E.2d at 89-90.
60. Cuyuch, 286 Ga. App. at 632-34,649 S.E.2d at 859-60; see O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3 (1995)
("Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free
from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the
res gestae.").

61. See Cuyuch, 284 Ga. 290, 667 S.E.2d 85.
62. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).

86
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res gestae altogether. 3 Those revisions, at least the part that eliminates the res gestae rule, would be a welcomed change.
V. IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION: PRE-TRIAL RULING REQUIRED;
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IS THE STANDARD

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2,' a person who uses threats or force to
protect self, habitation, or others may move the trial court to determine
whether the accused is immune from prosecution. 5 In Fair v. State,6 6
Antron Fair and Damon Jolly were accused of murdering a Bibb County
deputy when he and other members of a drug unit stormed the
defendants' house early one morning with a "no-knock" warrant. Both
men faced the possibility of the death penalty and moved the court for
a pre-trial ruling on immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2, but the court
reserved ruling until the conclusion of evidence at trial. Fair and Jolly
asked for and received interim review by the Georgia Supreme Court on
a number of issues. However, the court faced for the first time the
question of whether the immunity statute requires a pre-trial ruling
from the trial court on a defendant's immunity motion.r
The supreme court held that the court of appeals got it right in Boggs
v. State69 when it said "yes." In Boggs the court of appeals faced the
same question in a non-capital case.7' The court of appeals said,
According to Black's Law Dictionary,[72] one who is immune is
exempt or free from duty or penalty,[7' ] and prosecution is defined as
"[a] criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due
course of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime."[ 4 ]
Therefore, by the plain meaning of these terms and the other language
in the statute, the statute must be construed to bar criminal proceedings against persons who use force under the circumstances set forth

63. See W. RAY PERSONS ET AL., REPORT OF THE EVIDENCE STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA: PROPOSED NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE 8 (2005), available at
http://www.gabar.orgtpublic/pdf/news/proposedLnew-evidence_rules.pdf.
64. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 (2007).
65. See id.
66. 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).
67. Id. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 229-30.
68. Id. at 165-66, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
69. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).
70. Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
71. See Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 104-05, 581 S.E.2d at 722-23.
72. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
73. Id. at 676-77.
74. Id. at 1099.
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in [O.C.G.A.] § 16-3-23[' 5] or [O.C.GA.] § 16-3-24.[ 76] Further, as
the statute provides that such person "shall be immune from criminal
prosecution," the decision as to whether a person is immune under
by the trial court before the
[O.C.G.A.] § 16-3-24.2 must be determined
77
trial of that person commences.
Consequently, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to
make a pre-trial determination of the defendants' immunity from
prosecution.78
About three months later, the Georgia Supreme Court again faced the
task of construing the immunity statute-this time in a case in which a
police officer was accused of murder.79 The issue in Bunn v. State'
was about which standard of review to apply to a trial court's denial of
a motion for immunity from prosecution based upon O.C.G.A. § 16-324.2.81 The supreme court noted that immunity from prosecution
"represents a far greater right than any encompassed by an affirmative
defense,"" such as defense of self, habitation, or others. While an
affirmative defense may be raised at trial, a claim of immunity based
upon that same affirmative defense, if successful, eliminates a trial
altogether.'
When a defendant raises an affirmative defense, the
burden of proof at trial rests upon the State to disprove the affirmative
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.8 4 The supreme court established
for the first time in Bunn that "to avoid trial, a defendant bears the
burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under [O.C.G.A.] § 163-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence." 5
VI.

HOMELESS SEX OFFENDERS

6

In Santos v. State, William Santos was a sex offender who, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12," 7 was required to register." The registra-

75. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 (2007).
76. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24 (2007).
77. Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 106, 581 S.E.2d at 723 (emphasis added) (first alteration in
original), quoted in Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
78. Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
79. Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 667 S.E.2d 605 (2008).
80. 284 Ga. 410, 667 S.E.2d 605 (2008).
81. Id. at 412, 667 S.E.2d at 608.
82. Id. at 413, 667 S.E.2d at 608.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 291, 519 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1999)).
85. Id.
86. 284 Ga. 514, 668 S.E.2d 676 (2008).
87. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 (1997 & Supp. 2009).
88. Santos, 284 Ga. at 515, 668 S.E.2d at 678.
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tion statute requires a sex offender to give a residential address.s9 A
first conviction for violating this provision earns the offender a sentence
from ten to thirty years in prison.' A second conviction gets a life sentence. 9 Santos registered in 2006 when he lived at Good News at
Noon homeless shelter in Gainesville, Georgia. In July 2006 shelter
officials kicked him out, leaving Santos homeless until October 2006. At
this time, he was arrested and later indicted for failing to register a new
address within seventy-two hours of leaving the shelter.92 The trial
court denied his motion to quash the indictment, in which he challenged
the constitutionality of this statutory requirement. 93
The supreme court agreed with Santos that the residential registration
requirement violated due process under both state and federal constitutions because it was too vague to "give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair warning that specific conduct is forbidden or mandated."" On the
facts of this case, Santos had no address to register after July 2006, and
he was left to "guess as to how to achieve compliance with the statute's
reporting provisions."95 He would have been particularly perplexed
about what to do because the statute defines address as "the street or
route address of the sexual offender's residence," and for purposes of the
section, "the term does not mean a post office box, and homeless does not
constitute an address."9
The court said that the State's argument that a "geographic location"
would be enough to comply with the statute "would be more compelling"
had the Georgia General Assembly not specifically defined address.9 7
And even if the court accepted the State's interpretation, the statute
would still be unconstitutionally vague because the statute would have
authorized and even encouraged arbitrary, subjective, and potentionally
discriminatory enforcement.' The court made clear that its decision
to strike down the residential reporting requirement when a sex offender

89. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(1), (aX16), (f) (Supp. 2009).
90. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(n) (Supp. 2009).
91. Id., invalidated by Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 682-83, 671 S.E.2d 485, 492

(2008).
92. Santos, 284 Ga. at 515, 668 S.E.2d at 678.
93. Id. at 514, 668 S.E.2d at 677.
94. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 677-78 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,617 (1954);
Hall v. State, 268 Ga. 89, 92, 485 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1997)).
95. Id. at 515-16, 668 S.E.2d at 678.
96. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(aXl).
97. Santos, 284 Ga. at 516, 668 S.E.2d at 679.
98. See id. at 516-17, 668 S.E.2d at 679.
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is homeless "by no means" exempts the homeless from all other reporting
requirements in the statute.99
About a month later, in Bradshaw v. State, °° the Georgia Supreme
Court considered another sex offender residential reporting requirement
case-this time involving the imposition of a life sentence on Cedric
Bradshaw for his second failure to register. Bradshaw's initial offense,
the one that placed him under the sex offender registration statute,
involved his conviction for statutory rape two weeks after his nineteenth
birthday. He received a five-year sentence and served all but two
months of it in jail. The record was silent as to when and how
Bradshaw committed his first residential registration violation after his
release from prison, but Bradshaw did not dispute it.' 0 '
On this second occasion, however, Bradshaw initially registered that
he was living at his sister's house, but the Bulloch County Sheriff's
Department told him that he could not live there because it was within
one thousand feet of a children's recreation center.' °2 Bradshaw then
gave the sheriff's department his aunt's address, but the sheriff's
department told him that the address was also no good because it was
within one thousand feet of a church.'0 3 Bradshaw then gave the
sheriff's department a third address, but upon investigation, the sheriff's
department determined that no such address existed. A nearby address,
however, was occupied by a family friend of Bradshaw's. Bradshaw later
testified at his trial that he asked the friend if he could live there (and
the friend corroborated) but that he stayed with his girlfriend because
he had been unable to contact his friend for an answer to his inquiry.
But Bradshaw did not provide the sheriff's department with his
girlfriend's address, so when Bradshaw's sister-the same one Bradshaw
at first tried to live with-told him that the sheriff's department was
looking for him, he turned himself in, only to face a life sentence.'"
Bradshaw challenged the statutory requirement of a life sentence on
the basis that under both the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution °5 and article one, section one, paragraph seventeen of the
°
Georgia Constitution,'O
it constituted cruel and unusual punish-

99. Id. at 517, 668 S.E.2d at 679.
100. 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

101. Id. at 675-76 & nn.1, 4, 671 S.E.2d at 487-88 & nn.1, 4.
102. Id. at 675, 671 S.E.2d at 487-88 (citing O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(aX3) (Supp. 2009);
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(b) (1997)).
103. Id. at 675-76, 671 S.E.2d at 488 (citing O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(b)).
104. Id. at 676, 671 S.E.2d at 488.

105. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
106. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 17.
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ment. 117 This prohibition "flows from the basic precept of justice that
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense."0 8 Proportionality analysis requires comparing the "gravity
of the offense ... to the harshness of the penalty."10 9 Life in prison is
the third most serious punishment Georgia law imposes on a person,
behind the death penalty and life in prison without parole. 0 Only
murder or recidivist punishment for a serious violent felony qualify for
these more severe punishments."' Thus, the court concluded, Bradshaw's punishment met the threshold for gross disproportionality."2
If a rare case meets this threshold, the court continues the analysis by
comparing "the defendant's sentence to sentences imposed for other
crimes within Georgia . . . and for the same crime in other jurisdictions.""3
With respect to the intra-jurisdictional proportionality
analysis, the court noted that a mandatory life sentence is the minimum
sentence required for murder". and feticide." 5 Life imprisonment
is the only sentence available for aircraft hijacking".. and kidnapping
for ransom or kidnapping with bodily injury that does not result in
death.1 7 Life imprisonment is required for other lesser crimes when
the defendant is a recidivist who has committed a serious violent
felony," carjacking," 9 or a second conviction for the possession or
use of a firearm during an attempt to commit or actual commission of
certain crimes, or for wearing a bullet-proof vest during an attempt to
commit or the commission of certain crimes. 2 ° The court noted the
obvious: "[T]hese crimes are violent, more disruptive of society, and
require manifestly more culpability of a defendant than the failure of a

107. Bradshaw, 284 Ga. at 675, 671 S.E.2d at 487.
108. Id. at 676, 671 S.E.2d at 488 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008)).
109. Id. at 677, 671 S.E.2d at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 12 (2003); Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 525, 652 S.E.2d
501, 505 (2007)).
110. Id. at 679, 671 S.E.2d at 490.
111. Id. A "serious violent felony" includes malice and felony murder, armed robbery,
rape, kidnapping, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated sexual
battery. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(a)(1)-(7) (2008 & Supp. 2009); O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b) (2008).
112. Bradshaw, 284 Ga. at 680, 671 S.E.2d at 491.
113. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).
114. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 16-5-1(d) (2007 & Supp. 2009)).
115. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-80 (2007)).
116. Id. at 681, 671 S.E.2d at 491 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44(c) (2007)).
117. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 16-5-40(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 2009)).
118. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(a)(1)-(7); O.C.GA § 17-10-7(b) (2008)).
119. Id. (citing O.C.GA § 16-5-44.1(c) (2007)).
120. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-11-160 (2007 & Supp. 2009) (miscited in original)).
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registered sex offender to make authorities aware of a recent change in
address."12 ' Additionally, many more violent crimes, such as voluntary
manslaughter,'22 aggravated assault with the intent to murder, rape,
or rob,' 23 and aggravated battery.24 carry as little as one year; and
attempt to commit a violent injury on another is a misdemeanor."'
Bradshaw's life sentence, required by statute, was clearly disproportional
to these other sentences within Georgia's sentencing scheme. 2
When the court turned to other jurisdictions to determine what other
courts do in the face of conduct like Bradshaw's, the same disproportionality revealed itself.'27 In fact, every one of the fifty states punishes
sex offenders for failing to register properly, but only Georgia imposes
a life sentence for a second infraction. 2 None is even close; Georgia
is the "clear outlier, providing the harshest penalty," which results in a
"gross disparity" between Georgia and every other state in the entire
country.'29 Thus, the supreme court struck down this punishment as
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. 30
VII.

No MORE COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR ON A DEFENDANT'S
PRE-ARREST SILENCE

State,' 3'

In Reynolds v.
a jury convicted Paul Reynolds of aggravated
battery. The trial court and the court of appeals rejected Reynolds's
claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object to the following comment by the prosecutor during closing
argument: "I want you to consider that Mr. Reynolds had the opportunity to stay... that night and call the police or wait for police to respond
to give his version of the facts."" 2 The court of appeals concluded that
this comment was permissible because a prosecutor may comment on a
defendant's pre-arrest silence in all situations except when the defendant
remained silent in the face of questioning by a state agent or when the
defendant failed to come forward with information when he knew he was

121.

Id.

122. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(b) (2007)).
123.

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b) (2007)).

124. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(b) (2007)).
125. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 (2007)).
126.
127.
128.
-129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 682-83, 671 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 681-82, 671 S.E.2d at 491-92.
Id. at 681, 671 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 682, 671 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 683, 671 S.E.2d at 492.
285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).
Id. at 70, 673 S.E.2d at 854 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
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the target of a criminal investigation." The supreme court concluded
that these exceptions were "ill-founded" and reversed the court of
appeals." 4
The United States Supreme Court has held that the prosecution may
comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence in a situation when no
government action has induced it and when the defendant testified at
trial, thus waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.' 35 However, Georgia may formulate its own rules "defining the situations in which
silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial."'36 The General
Assembly has formulated an evidentiary rule that acknowledges that a
person's "[aicquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an
answer, a denial, or other conduct, may amount to an admission."'37
Therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that "a comment
upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward is far more
prejudicial than probative.""1 8
Despite the "clarity of [this] bright-line evidentiary rule" enunciated
by the Georgia Supreme Court, the court of appeals continued to allow
prosecutors to comment on defendants' silence except in two circumstances: (1) when a defendant remained silent in the face of questioning
by a state agent and (2) when a defendant failed to come forward when
he knew he was a target of investigation. 39 No more. In Reynolds the
supreme court not only overruled Morrison v. State,"4 in which the
court of appeals created the above exceptions,' but also overruled any
other cases that conflicted with this "bright-line" rule. 4 2 Any negative
comment by a prosecutor regarding a defendant's pre-arrest silence is

133. Id. at 70-71,673 S.E.2d at 854-55; see also Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625,630,409
S.E.2d 839, 843 (1991). The court of appeals in Reynolds relied upon rulings similar to the

one in Mallory made in Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 123-24, 630 S.E.2d 621, 632
(2006), and Roebuck v. State, 261 Ga. App. 679, 684, 583 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2003). See
Reynolds, 285 Ga. at 71 n.2, 673 S.E.2d at 855 n.2.
134. Reynolds, 285 Ga. at 71, 72, 673 S.E.2d at 855.
135. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982).
136. Reynolds, 285 Ga. at 71, 673 S.E.2d at 855 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Mallory, 261 Ga. at 630, 409 S.E.2d at 843).
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-36
(1995)).

138. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mallory, 261 Ga. at 630,409 S.E.2d at 843).
139. Id. (citing Morrison v. State, 251 Ga. App. 161, 164, 554 S.E.2d 190, 193 (2001)).
140.

251 Ga. App. 161, 554 S.E.2d 190 (2001).

141. Id. at 164, 554 S.E.2d at 193.
142. Reynolds, 285 Ga. at 71-72, 673 S.E.2d at 855 (overruling Glidewell v. State, 279
Ga. App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (2006); Roebuck v. State, 261 Ga. App. 679, 583 S.E.2d 523
(2003)).
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now impermissible, no matter what circumstances under which the
defendant remained silent and even if he testifies in his own trial.'4 3
VIII.

DEFENDANT'S OPENING STATEMENT IN THE PENALTY PHASE OF

A DEATH PENALTY CASE: YES, YOU CAN
In O'Kelley v. State,'" a jury convicted Dorian Frank O'Kelley of all

manner of mayhem, including the murders of a woman and her thirteenyear-old daughter, arson, burglary, child cruelty, five counts of entering
an automobile to commit theft, and even a drug offense. In addition to
convicting him, the jury recommended he receive the death penalty."5
Among the many appellate issues O'Kelley raised, one deserves mention
in this year's Survey because it involves the announcement of a new
procedural rule in all future death penalty cases and, in so doing,
overrules several contrary cases.'46
At the close of the State's presentation of evidence in aggravation of
sentence-the evidence for giving O'Kelley the death penalty after his
conviction-defense counsel requested permission to make an opening
statement. When the trial court agreed to allow it, the State objected
and argued that because the State did not make an opening statement,
the defense was not allowed to do so. The State further argued that no
law required the court to grant the defendant's request and cited local
custom against it in situations like O'Kelley's, and the court was
persuaded to change147its mind, thus prohibiting O'Kelley from making an
opening statement.
The State was correct in its argument to the trial court and on appeal
that no statute, rule, or case required allowing an opening statement by
the defense in the penalty phase of a capital trial. 14 But noting what
it said on previous occasions, the court stated that it would be the better
practice to allow one.' 49 The court took this occasion to go further,
holding that under both its "inherent power ... 'to maintain a court
system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an
orderly and efficient manner ' ""° and its "authority to make rules to

143.
144.
145.
146.
S.E.2d
147.
148.
149.
150.
S.E.2d

See id.
284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008).
Id. at 758, 670 S.E.2d at 391.
See id. at 768, 670 S.E.2d at 398 (overruling Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 525
339 (1999); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 510 S.E.2d 1 (1998)).
Id. at 765, 670 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. (citing Smith, 270 Ga. at 250, 510 S.E.2d at 11).
Id. (citing Smith, 270 Ga. at 250, 510 S.E.2d at 11).
Id. at 768, 670 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 532, 408
97, 98 (1991)).
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'provide for the ... efficient ... resolution of ... prosecutions,'" 151

-rules the court promulgated in the Georgia Uniform Superior Court
Rules' 5 2-it was no longer within the trial court's discretion whether
to allow an opening statement by the defense in the penalty phase of a
capital trial."53 In O'Kelley's case, nevertheless, the error was harmless and did not require reversal."'
IX.

KIDNAPPING: IT'S NOT AS CLEAR AS IT WAS WHEN THEY TOOK
LINDBERGH'S BABY
When the Georgia Supreme Court encountered Joey Garza's case, the
court concluded it was time to end the "courts' history of.hair-splitting
decisions as to what is sufficient asportation'" in kidnapping and bring
some clarity to the definition of this crime." The statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 16-5-40, ss defined the crime thus: "A person commits the offense of
kidnapping when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful
authority or warrant and holds such person against his will."'5 7 The
"movement" part of the crime-the asportation element-created a body
of law over the years that turned any sort of "slight movement" of a
person, even during the commission of another crime but more than
inconsequential to it, into the separate crime of kidnapping."18 A
slight positional change in a victim was enough, so long as it was
"designed to better carry out the criminal activity."59 "The definition
of asportation has evolved to the point where it seems that the only type
of movement considered insufficient as evidence of asportation
is
6°
movement immediately resulting from a physical struggle."'
Garza entered Angel Mendoza's house ostensibly to retrieve his wallet
from her van, but then he pulled a gun on her, held it to her head, and
threatened to shoot her if she did not do what he said. When Mendoza
attempted to push the gun away from her head, Garza hit her with it,
causing her to fall to the floor. He tied her up and sat her in a chair but

151. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting GA. CONsT. art. VI, § 9, para. 1).
152. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 10.2.
153. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 768, 670 S.E.2d at 398.
154. Id. at 769, 670 S.E.2d at 399.

155. Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696, 698, 670 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2008) (quoting Haynes v.
State, 249 Ga. 119, 120, 288 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1982)).
156. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 (2007), amended by Ga. H.R. Bill 575, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga.

Laws 331, 331-32.
157. Id. § 16-5-40(a).
158. Garza, 284 Ga. at 698-99, 670 S.E.2d at 75-76.
159. Id. at 698,670 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lyons v. State, 282

Ga. 588, 591, 652 S.E.2d 525, 529 (2007)).
160. Id.
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eventually let her move to the floor with her infant daughter, where she
pretended to fall asleep. Garza then fell asleep, at which time Mendoza
grabbed her two-year-old son, climbed out a window, and called the
police. As the police forcibly entered the house, Garza grabbed J.M.,
Mendoza's nine-year-old son, by the shirt and ordered him to move to a
back bedroom with Garza. The police rescued the infant daughter and
then negotiated J.M.'s release for a six-pack of beer.'61
In addition to four counts of false imprisonment of Angel Mendoza and
her three children, a jury convicted Garza of two counts of kidnapping
for knocking Mendoza to the floor with the gun and for moving J.M. by
the shirt from one room to another.162 The punishment for false
imprisonment is one to ten years"6 while kidnapping carries ten to
twenty years without parole when the victim is fourteen or over, and life
when the victim is under fourteen."e The critical issue for Garza,
therefore, was whether the forced movements of Mendoza and her son
were sufficient to support a finding of guilt on the more severe kidnapping charges.
The supreme court adopted a "more cogent standard for determining
the sufficiency of evidence of asportation" than had previously existed." The court adopted the standard first articulated in Government
of the Virgin Islands v. Berry,'66 a four-part test that several states
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have
adopted.6 7 This test holds that the asportation element of kidnapping
requires assessment of
(1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred
during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such
movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and (4)
whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the
victim independent of the danger posed by the separate offense.168

161. Id. at 696-97, 670 S.E.2d at 74.
162. See id. at 696, 703-04, 670 S.E.2d at 74, 79.
163. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(b) (2007).
164. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(d)(1)--(2) (2007 & Supp. 2009); Garza, 284 Ga. at 701, 670
S.E.2d at 77.
165. Garza, 284 Ga. at 701, 670 S.E.2d at 78. To reach its decision, the court analyzed
the development of the kidnapping prohibition in Georgia and constitutional concerns over

due process and proportionality. Id. at 698-701, 670 S.E.2d at 75-77. The court also
conducted a comparison to the Model Penal Code and other jurisdictions. Id.
166. 604 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1979).
167. Garza, 284 Ga. at 702 & n.4, 670 S.E.2d at 78 & n.4 (collecting cases).
168. Id. at 702, 670 S.E.2d at 78.
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Applying this test to Garza's behavior, the court concluded that "it [was]
clear that neither of the two distinct movements of Mendoza during
Garza's false imprisonment of her constitute[d] the necessary asportation
to support a kidnapping conviction." 169 Likewise, although Garza's
movement of J.M. involved a "slightly greater quantum of movement
than that as to Mendoza," it too failed the Berry test. 7 ' These two
kidnapping convictions, therefore, were reversed.' 7 '
The decision in Garza gained no small amount of attention from
practicing prosecutors and defense lawyers, as well as scrutiny by the
General Assembly. In direct response to Garza, the General Assembly
amended O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 in April 2009 by adding three new
subparagraphs: (b), which defines slight movement; (c), which specifies
that kidnapping can not merge with any other offense; and (f), which
declares kidnapping to be a "continuous offense" such that venue can be
established in any county where the accused exercised dominion or
control over the victim. 17 2 Expect litigation to continue in the coming

year, however, and additional constitutional attacks to be advanced,
some of which have been adumbrated by Garza itself.
X. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: IT'S NOT JUST FOR DEATH PENALTY
DEFENDANTS AND RECIDIVISTS ANYMORE

The General Assembly amended the murder statute, 7 ' amended
some sections of Chapter 10 of Title 17,""4 and repealed other sections 75 to provide for the imposition of a sentence of life without
parole for people convicted of murder without first requiring that the
State seek the death penalty. 7 6 In a murder case when the State
believes the appropriate punishment is life without parole, the State
may now seek that punishment without first giving notice of its intent
to seek the death penalty.7 7 Prior to the amendment, the State had

169.
170.
171.

Id. at 703, 670 S.E.2d at 79.
Id. at 704, 670 S.E.2d at 79.
Id., 670 S.E.2d at 79-80.

172.

Ga. H.R. Bill 575, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 331, 331-32 (codified at O.C.G.A.

§ 16-5-40(b)-(c), (f) (Supp. 2009)).

173.

Ga. S. Bill 13, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 223, 224 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-

1 (2007 & Supp. 2009)).

174. Id. §§ 2-3, 5, 2009 Ga. Laws at 224-26 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-2, -6.1, -31
(2008 Supp. & 2009)).
175. Id. §§ 4, 6-7, 2009 Ga. Laws at 226-27 (repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 17-20-30.1, -31.1,
-32.1 (2008)).

176. Id. § 10, 2009 Ga. Laws at 227.
177. Id.
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to give notice of intent-to seek the death penalty to have any chance of
achieving a no-parole life sentence,178 even in cases when death was
not what a district attorney actually desired or had a reasonable chance
of acquiring.19 It remains to be seen whether this important amendment to the murder statute and related sentencing provisions will result
in fewer notices of intent to seek death and, consequently, fewer death
penalty sentences. It also remains to be seen whether, concomitant with
fewer death sentences, Georgia will see an increase in life without parole
sentences.

178. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1(2008), repealedby Ga. S. Bill 13, § 7,2009 Ga. Laws at 227.
179. See id.
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